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Abstract Contracts are used to coordinate disparate but
interdependent members of the supply chain. Conflicting
objectives of these members and lack of coordination
among the members lead to inefficiencies in matching
supply with demand. This study reviews different types of
contracts and proposes a methodology to be used by
companies for analyzing coordinating contracts with their
business partners. Efficiency of the contract is determined
by comparing the performance of independent companies
under the contract to the supply chain performance under
the central decision maker assumption. We propose a
penalty and reward contract between a manufacturer and its
logistics service provider that distributes the manufac-
turer’s products on its retail network. The proposed con-
tract analysis methodology is empirically tested with
transportation data of a consumer durable goods company
(CDG) and its logistics service provider (LSP). The results
of this case study suggest a penalty and reward contract
between the CDG and its LSP that improves not only the
individual firm’s objective functions but also the supply
chain costs. Compared to the existing situation, the coor-
dination efficiency of the penalty and reward contract is
96.1 %, proving that optimizing contract parameters
improves coordination and leads to higher efficiencies.
Keywords Logistics contract  Case study  Newsvendor
problem  Consumer durable goods sector  Third-party
logistics service provider
1 Introduction
Supply chain contracts are widely used to coordinate dis-
parate but interdependent members of the supply chain.
Contract clauses are legally binding for the supply chain
parties, and within the scope of a supply chain relationship,
parties define expected actions from each other and mea-
sures in case these expectations are not met. In this study,
we analyze two companies operating in a supply chain
using such contracts. The two companies are a consumer
durable goods manufacturer (CDG) and its logistics service
provider (LSP). We find the contract parameters that
improve the efficiency of coordination and provide the
decision maker, in particular the CDG, with alternative
parameter combinations to achieve the same level of effi-
ciency. We empirically test our proposed contract with the
CDG’s data on deliveries distributed by the LSP on the
CDG’s retail network.
In its broadest definition, coordination is managing
dependencies between activities [1]. Supply chain coordi-
nation, on the other hand, is the parties’ optimal arrange-
ment of factors related to the supply chain to minimize
total supply chain costs or to maximize total supply chain
profits, considering the parties’ own objectives [2]. In line
with the established literature on supply chain coordination
with contracts, we define a coordinating contract as a
contract that Pareto dominates a non-coordinating contract,
where each firm is no worse off and at least one firm is
strictly better off with this contract [3]. This means, even if
the contract is not optimizing the supply chain performance
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(for example, minimize supply chain cost or maximize
supply chain profit), it would still be considered coordi-
nating as long as the parties using the contract are better off
with the contract than without the contract.
A coordination mechanism should improve the overall
system performance and distribute the benefits of coordi-
nation in a manner that entices both decision makers’
cooperation [4]. Bilateral contracts signed between supply
chain members define the expectations of each party within
the scope of the supply chain relationship, as well as the
measures to be taken in case one or more of these expec-
tations are not met. The lack of coordination is generally
due to different information levels and/or different incen-
tives of the parties, and it may lead to reductions in supply
chain performance by means of incorrect forecasts, low
capacity utilization, low stock turnover, high holding and
related storage costs, delays in product launch, low-order
fulfillment rates, insufficient customer service, or low
customer satisfaction [5].
Our research aims to coordinate production and distri-
bution by analyzing alternative contract parameters for a
newsvendor model-based penalty and reward contract.
This contract is empirically tested and observed to improve
the performance (i.e., cost and profit) of supply chain
members. In this respect, we focus on applicable contracts
between a manufacturer and its logistics service provider
and provide a concise review of the recent advancements in
the field in Sect. 2, present our methodology in Sect. 3, test
and discuss the proposed penalty–reward contracts with
empirical data in Sect. 4, and discuss the findings and
conclude the paper in Sect. 5.
2 Literature review
Logistics play a key role in the distribution of goods from
raw material suppliers to original equipment manufacturers
to end-consumers. Logistics outsourcing is an effective
way to achieve a competitive advantage, improve customer
services, and reduce logistics costs [6]. Firms that choose
to outsource their logistics activities can reduce their fixed
costs and increase their flexibility. For subcontracting
manufacturing or outsourcing logistics, contracts are
widely implemented across various stages of the supply
chain [3]. A large amount of research focuses on con-
tracting as primary source of coordination between supply
chain members [7]. Selviaridis and Norrman [8] explore
key challenges of adopting, analyzing, and managing per-
formance-based contracts for advanced logistics services
from the viewpoint of logistics service providers and
highlight the limited empirical work in this area. They
recognize the challenges associated with contract analysis
as the definition of performance metrics and highlight the
resource investment as an issue for contract management.
Kaya [9] analyzes supply chain contracts for decen-
tralized supply chain models and identifies which contracts
between two parties are the best to use in different cases.
The contracts modeled are between an original equipment
manufacturer (OEM) and its contract manufacturer for the
production of one of the OEM’s products. Taking into
account the effort exerted by the OEM or its supplier to
affect the demand for the products together with the pricing
decisions, the author considers centralized and decentral-
ized models of the supply chain. Especially for the
decentralized setting, he analyzes and compares several
different contracts with each other and concludes that the
coordinating contract depends on the party exerting the
effort.
Liu and Wang [10] model the logistics service supply
chain considering logistics service integrators and logistics
service providers and investigate the influence of risk
attitudes of chain members on quality control in the
logistics service supply chain. Rather than optimizing the
contract parameters, these authors analyze the LSP’s
compliance and non-compliance with the contract that
governs the relationship between the LSP and the logistics
service integrator using game theory. They conclude that
risk attitude combinations affect the coordination effi-
ciency; in particular, the logistics service integrator prefers
a risk-seeking LSP when it aims to achieve high supply
chain coordination efficiency [10].
Within the supply chain contract literature, option con-
tracts are preferred when there is a high uncertainty of
demand. In option contracts, the buyer prepays a certain
amount of money (reservation premium) to the seller so
that the seller commits to reserving a certain level of
capacity for the buyer. In the event that the buyer does not
exercise the option to ship the goods, the reservation pre-
mium is lost. If the buyer exercises the option, then it pays
the agreed contractual unit price [11–15]. On the other
hand, revenue-sharing contracts are preferred when the
cost of procurement is high. In revenue-sharing contracts,
the seller offers the buyer a low price at the beginning of
the contract period. The buyer, in response, shares its
revenue with the seller at the end of the period [16–19].
Revenue-sharing contracts coordinate the supply chain by
allocating the supply chain’s profit between the seller and
the buyer [20]. He and Liu [21] model the logistics service
supply chains using a joint option contract and a revenue-
sharing contract between a logistics service integrator, an
LSP, and a logistics service subcontractor among which the
logistics capacity should be coordinated. The contracts
aimed at stimulating the logistics service subcontractor to
improve its service level and providing a cost and revenue
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sharing between the logistics service integrator and the
LSP.
On the other hand, in the penalty and reward contracts, the
buyer either charges a penalty to the seller for undelivered
items or gives a reward for on-time shipments. The basic
purpose of such contracts is to motivate the seller to reserve
sufficient capacity for the buyer. Since, whether the seller
reserved sufficient capacity or notwill be known only after the
buyer has placed its orders, this type of contract can be ana-
lyzed using the well-known newsvendor models [3, 22–25].
The three characteristics that define these models are:
1. any resource requirement is governed by random
processes
2. the decision as to how much of this resource to have is
made before the requirement for the resource is known,
and
3. all economic results can be represented by either
having too much or too little of the resource. The
newsvendor model minimizes the total overage and
underage costs of the buyer.
Contracts coordinating the manufacturer and its service
provider have not yet drawn much attention in the literature.
Notably, Alp et al. [28] modeled the contracts between a
manufacturer and its LSP within the framework of a bidding
mechanism. However, in our study, the LSP has already
been selected, and therefore, contract parameters, which
would make the LSP fulfill the manufacturer’s delivery
orders, have to be determined. Within this scope, the
methodology suggested here for analyzing contracts, and
particularly contracts between amanufacturer and its service
provider, can easily be adjusted for use in other domains.
Summing up, the contracts between supply chain
members can help reduce supply chain costs and achieve
coordination. It is possible to describe the objective func-
tions of different members of the supply chain using
mathematical equations, in particular the buyer’s cost
function and the seller’s profit function. The works in the
previous literature used the total supply chain cost under
central decision maker assumption as a benchmark to
evaluate the coordination efficiency of proposed contracts
(e.g. 3, 9). Informed by the works cited, we describe our
method to analyzing contracts to coordinate a manufacturer
and its logistics service provider in the next section.
3 Methodology
Coordinating contracts between supply chain partners can
be analyzed using the distributed decision-making (DDM)
paradigm, which is defined as the analysis and coordination
of interconnected decisions [26]. It is especially useful when
there are multiple decision makers in the system, and these
decision makers have different information statuses and
decision-making rights. Self-coordination, two well-known
mechanisms of which are competition and cooperation, is
not always possible in a distributed decision-making setting,
especially when hierarchical relationships exist between the
decision makers [26]. Generally, the priority and the
precedence characteristics of interconnected decisions that
need to be analyzed and coordinated result in a hierarchical
structure. This hierarchy can be power based (depending on
the authority of decision makers) or time based (depending
on precedence of decisions). There are basically three dif-
ferent stages of interdependence: anticipation, instruction,
and reaction. The party at the top level of the hierarchy
(CDG) is either the more powerful party or it has the deci-
sion precedence, whereas the party at the base level (LSP) is
rather dependent on the decisions of the top level, which is
the CDG. The CDG anticipates the reaction of the LSP
before making a decision and then informs the LSP of its
decision (instruction, which are the contract parameters).
The LSP responds to this instruction by maximizing its
objective function (reaction, maximizing its LSP’s profit).
The LSP does not have a say on the level of parameters but
has a right to accept or reject the contract and can decide to
increase its capacity dedicated to the CDG if it helps
improve its profits. The DDM system between the CDG and
the LSP affects the performance of each party as well as the
supply chain. The hierarchy of decisions between the CDG
and the LSP is given in Fig. 1.
When the capacity availability of the LSP is an issue,
penalty and reward contracts can be used to coordinate the
parties. We consider the long-term capacity of the logistics
service provider as T. The logistics service provider serves
not only the CDG but also other clients. To include this
aspect of the logistics network, we incorporate t as a ran-
dom percentage of the LSP’s available capacity with a
lower limit tl and an upper limit tu. When the CDG places
its order, the LSP knows the probability density function
f tð Þ of t but does not know the realized value of t. For a
continuous function, the probability density function is the
probability that the variate has the value x. Since for con-
tinuous distributions the probability at a single point is
zero, this is expressed in terms of an integral between two
points: P aX b½  ¼ R
b
a
f xð Þdx. This is a way of incorpo-
rating the uncertainty in the supply chain into the rela-
tionship between CDG and LSP.
As explained in the literature review, the LSP can be
stimulated to increase its delivery capacity dedicated to the
CDG by i, before it receives orders from other companies
in its supply chain, so its capacity available to the CDG
would be tT þ i. The deliveries of the LSP (x) depend on
CDG’s delivery orders (o) and the LSP’s capacity (tT þ i)
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available to the CDG. Deliveries of the LSP cannot exceed
its available capacity or the order placed by the CDG
(xminðo; tT þ i)). CDG’s cost depends on LSP’s fulfill-
ment of the delivery orders. If the LSP fulfills fewer
deliveries than CDG needs, then CDG faces unmet delivery
cost (u); if CDG orders more than required, it incurs a cost
of excess orders (d). CDG also incurs the delivery cost (c)
depending on the actual number of deliveries (x). Hence,
the cost of CDG is CDGcost ¼ u X  x½ þþd x X½ þþcx.
Here, X is the demand for the CDG’s finished goods (re-
quired deliveries) in the classical newsvendor setting [22].
T expected cost of CDG depending on its delivery orders
(o) is given in Eq. (1) [23].
E CDGcost oð Þð Þ ¼ u
Zmin
oi
T
;Xi
Tð Þ
tl
X  tT þ ið Þð Þf tð Þdt þ u X  oð Þ
Ztu
oi
T
f tð Þdt1fX[ og þ d
Z
oi
T
Xi
T
tT þ i Xð Þf tð Þdt þ d o Xð Þ
Ztu
oi
T
f tð Þdt1 X of g
þ c
Z
oi
T
tl
tT þ ið Þf tð Þdt þ co
Ztu
oi
T
f tð Þdt
ð1Þ
The term 1 X[ of g in E CDGcost oð Þð Þ is 1 X[ of g ¼
1 X[ o
0 X o

and 1 X of g is defined similarly. The o min-
imizing CDG’s cost would be o ¼ argoptðE CDGcostð Þ,
which would make
oE CDGcost oð Þð Þ
oo ¼ 0 (Eq. 2). The derivation
of
oE CDGcost oð Þð Þ
oo is given in the ‘‘Appendix’’.
o ¼ X þ T F1 nþ e
cþ e
 
 utl þ dtu þ c tu  tlð Þ
uþ d
 
ð2Þ
Determination of the lower bounds and upper bounds of
the integrals in Eq. (1) follows from the cost of CDG
(CDGcost); CDG incurs unmet delivery cost (u) when the
orders are less than required by the demand for its finished
products (X); and excess delivery cost (d) when delivery
orders are more than required by the demand for its fin-
ished products; and the cost of deliveries (c) depending on
the realized deliveries. In each case, the CDG’s cost
depends on the LSP’s capacity to meet the orders (t oi
T
)
or required deliveries (t Xi
T
).
Since CDG is paying for the service it receives from the
LSP, the profit of the LSP can be written in a similar
fashion: LSPprofit ¼ cmin tT þ i; oð Þ  e tT þ i o½ þni,
where c is the unit payment made by CDG to LSP, e is the
unit cost of unutilized capacity, and n is the unit cost of
capacity increase incurred by the LSP. Then the expected
profit of LSP is given in Eq. (3).
E LSPprofit ið Þ  ¼ c
Z
io
T
tl
tT þ ið Þf tð Þdt þ co
Ztu
io
T
f tð Þdt
 e
Ztu
oi
T
tT þ i oð Þf tð Þdt  ni ð3Þ
Since the LSP already has the long-term capacity T, it
needs to decide on the capacity increase dedicated to the
CDG (i). The i maximizing LSP’s profit would be
i ¼ argoptðE LSPprofit , which would make oE LSP
profit ið Þð Þ
oi ¼
0 (Eq. 4).
Fig. 1 Hierarchy of decisions between the CDG and the LSP
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i ¼ o T  F1 nþ e
cþ e
 
ð4Þ
The penalty and reward terms can then be incorporated
into the CDG’s expected cost and the LSP’s expected profit
by integrating on the intervals where the LSP would incur a
penalty cost for unmet delivery orders and receive a reward
where the orders are met. There will be an additional
penalty term in CDG’s equation that would reduce the cost
and an additional reward term that would increase the cost
since the reward would be given out to the LSP. The
expected cost of CDG is given in Eq. (5) depending on its
delivery orders (o) as well as the penalty (p) and the reward
(r) terms.
E CDGcost o;p; rð Þð Þ
¼ u
Zmin
oi
T
;Xi
Tð Þ
tl
X tT þ ið Þð Þf tð Þdtþ u X oð Þ

Ztu
oi
T
f tð Þdt1fX[og þ d
Z
oi
T
Xi
T
tT þ iXð Þf tð Þdtþ d oXð Þ

Ztu
oi
T
f tð Þdt1 Xof g þ c
Z
oi
T
tl
tT þ ið Þf tð Þdt
þ co
Ztu
oi
T
f tð Þdt p
Z
oi
T
tl
o tT þ ið Þð Þf tð Þdtþ r
Ztu
oi
T
f tð Þdt
ð5Þ
Similarly, the penalty term would reduce the LSP’s
profit and the reward term would increase the LSP’s profit.
As explained earlier, the LSP does not have a right to
decide on the penalty (p) or the reward (r) but can decide
on its capacity increase (i) given the penalty and the
reward. In Eq. (6) we provide the expected profit of the
LSP given the penalty and the reward terms based on the
capacity increase i.
E LSPprofitpr ið Þ
	 

¼ c
Z
io
T
tl
tT þ ið Þf tð Þdt þ co
Ztu
io
T
f tð Þdt
 e
Ztu
oi
T
tT þ i oð Þf tð Þdt
 ni p
Z
oi
T
tl
o tT þ ið Þð Þf tð Þdt þ r
Ztu
oi
T
f tð Þdt
ð6Þ
From the supply chain management perspective, it
would be optimal to determine the capacity increase that
incurs the minimum expected cost for the entire supply
chain; hence, we define the expected cost of the centralized
supply chain as the difference between the total cost of the
CDG and the total profit of the LSP since the supply chain
we analyze for the contract is focused on the transaction
between these two companies. The centralized supply
chain can be interpreted as a single decision maker who
manages both the CDG’s operations and the LSP’s oper-
ations [21]. Then this central decision maker would like to
minimize the expected centralized supply chain cost that is
given in Eq. (7).
E SCcost ið Þð Þ ¼ u
Z
Xi
T
0
X  tT þ ið Þð Þf tð Þdt
þmin d; ef g
Z1
Xi
T
tT þ ið Þ  Xð Þf tð Þdt þ ni
ð7Þ
In the centralized supply chain analysis, there is no need
for delivery orders (o) since the central decision maker will
organize deliveries according to the external demand X.
Accordingly, we define seven possible scenarios
(Table 1) between the CDG and the LSP, to represent the
current situation (S1), the delivery orders that lead to the
optimum capacity increase under the centralized supply
chain (S2), the delivery orders that minimize the CDG’s
cost (S3), the penalty that leads to the optimum capacity
increase under the centralized supply chain (S4), the
reward that leads to the optimum capacity increase under
the centralized supply chain (S5), the penalty and the
reward that lead to the optimum capacity increase under
the centralized supply chain (S6), and the optimum
capacity increase under the centralized supply chain (S7).
The S1 is the current situation, where the CDG and LSP
act independently, and the S7 is the ideal situation where a
central decision maker optimizes the capacity increase that
would minimize the expected total cost for the entire
supply chain, using the total costs incurred by the CDG and
the LSP. In S2 and S3, the CDG does not use the penalty or
the reward in the contract but tries to stimulate the LSP to
increase its capacity by its delivery orders. S2 is analyzed
to reflect the optimal capacity increase under the central-
ized supply chain, whereas S3 is analyzed to reflect the
situation that minimizes the CDG’s cost. S4–S6 are ana-
lyzed around the penalty and reward terms, all stimulating
the optimal capacity increase required under the centralized
supply chain, by using only the penalty (S4), only the
reward (S5), and both the penalty and the reward (S6).
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Later, for all scenarios S2–S6, we evaluate the efficiency of
the coordinating contract; i.e., how close the cost under the
given contract is to the centralized supply chain cost. In the
next section, we provide parameters calculated from the
empirical data of the CDG and discuss the performance of
each contract scenario (S2–S6) in comparison with the
current situation (S1) and the ideal situation under cen-
tralized supply chain (S7). We also provide a sensitivity
analysis on the contract parameters.
4 Case study
The proposed methodology is followed to analyze logistics
contracts between two companies conducting business in
Turkey, a consumer durable goods manufacturer (CDG)
and its highest volume logistics service provider (LSP).
During face-to-face interviews held with CDG Supply
Chain Director and SAP Project Manager in May–July
2009, they indicated delivery problems with all of their
logistics service providers and primarily with the LSP
carrying the highest volume. Since the LSP delivering the
highest amount of goods from CDG’s factories to CDG’s
retail channel transports, approximately 60 % of the man-
ufacturer’s products by volume, it was decided to start
working on logistics contracts with this company and then
extend the findings to contracts with other logistics service
providers. Figure 2 gives an idea of the extent of operations
with stars indicating hubs and arrows depicting the cities
that these hubs serve. Manisa in the west of Turkey with
two stars is where the factory of CDG is located.
There are multiple dealers of CDG in every city in
Fig. 2. There is an ordering mechanism where CDG’s
dealers place orders for products but also CDG pushes its
products to the market based on its own marketing fore-
casts and campaigns. CDG uses historical sales data to
forecast its future sales. However, as a consequence of the
effects of the global economic crisis on Turkey in 2009,
great variations were observed between actual sales and
estimated sales in the first three quarters of 2009. Another
cause of these variations was the tax reduction exercised by
the government between March and June 2009 to boost the
Table 1 Scenarios tested in the
contract analysis
Scenario Definition
S1 No coordination
S2 Coordinating contract with delivery order that achieves the optimum capacity increase
S3 Coordinating contract with delivery order that minimizes CDG’s cost
S4 Coordinating contract with penalty that achieves the optimum capacity increase
S5 Coordinating contract with reward that achieves the optimum capacity increase
S6 Coordinating contract with penalty and reward that achieve the optimum capacity increase
S7 Coordination under central decision maker assumption
Fig. 2 Factory in Manisa (double star), hubs (single star), and cities served (left arrow)
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economic activities. This reduction resulted in increased
sales until the end of June 2009 when the reduction ceased
to be in effect (Fig. 3a, volumes disguised due to confi-
dentiality) and sales dropped back to the level before the
government’s intervention. In the analysis period (January–
August 2009), CDG’s LSP has completed 65,000 deliveries
(disguised), with an on-time delivery performance pre-
sented in Fig. 3b.
Apart from the low on-time delivery performance in
April–May originating from the unexpected increase in
CDG’s demand due to tax reduction introduced by the
government to revitalize the economic activity in the
country, the LSP does not reserve sufficient capacity for
CDG; it is late 30 % of the time, on average, and a capacity
increase in the fleet is required. With the exception of 56 %
on-time delivery performance of the LSP at the end of
April and beginning of May, it is observed that the LSP’s
on-time delivery performance ranges between 65 and
75 %. This interval is the percentage of LSP’s available
capacity (t [ [0.65–0.75], uniform-distributed with the
mathematical expression given in Table 1) in the current
situation. It is clear that a mechanism is needed for the LSP
to increase its available capacity for CDG to decrease the
costs associated with non-delivery or late delivery. Fig-
ure 4 provides the volume of late deliveries for 1–6? days.
CDG explains that most of these delays are based on
operational planning deficiencies or not taking into account
local conditions (for example, regular closures of main
streets due to local farmers markets).
The LSP’s late deliveries result in CDG’s not being able
to place their products in the market on time and conse-
quently incurring lost sales. For the white goods industry,
the value of lost sales is calculated as 11 % of the sales
value [27]. This rate is used to estimate the CDG’s cost due
to late deliveries. In the analysis phase of the contract,
aggregated data are used; delivery volumes are represented
in terms of vehicles and delivery costs are calculated based
on average values because the data on deliveries, delivery
costs, and sales are not kept at the same detail. To meet the
confidentiality requirements, we had to disguise all of the
actual figures. Following from [27], we calculate 11 % of
the average sales per vehicle to estimate the cost of unmet
deliveries per vehicle for CDG (u = TRY 6275). Based on
the proportion of transportation cost in gross sales provided
by CDG, we calculate the average transportation cost per
vehicle (c = TRY 1550).
There are also costs associated with CDG’s ordering
more than required due to forecasting errors or marketing
decisions. When CDG sends products more than the actual
demand, these products may be returned by the dealers on
the basis of insufficient space. All returns are transported
back to the factory using the LSP’s courier network since
the returned items would not fill up a truck. Subsequently,
using the courier network is more expensive than using the
freight transportation. Analyzing the returns data (returned
items, item volumes, return costs) and aggregating on the
basis of vehicles, the transportation cost of returned items
per vehicle is calculated to be TRY 1745. Since CDG
initially incurred the transportation cost to send these items
to its dealers, the cost of ordering deliveries more than
required per vehicle (d) is this return cost: TRY 1745 (the
return delivery cost using the courier service). At the time
of data collection, 9.7 % of CDG’s deliveries were
returned by its dealers.
According to the analysis on the transported volumes,
CDG’s monthly delivery requirement is 130 vehicles on
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average (v = 130). The LSP’s delivery capacity is calcu-
lated from the information provided on the company
website in August 2009. While T is the LSP’s available
capacity for all its clients, as can be seen in Fig. 3b, the
LSP has on average 70 % of its capacity available to the
CDG (i.e., E t½  ¼ 0:7). Taking into consideration other
customers of the LSP, it is estimated that the LSP reserves
91 vehicles to CDG (available capacity in terms of vehi-
cles, T  E t½  ¼ 130 :7 ¼ 91) per month, lower than
what CDG requires as is evident from the delivery per-
formance. The LSP needs to increase this capacity to
improve its delivery performance, and the cost of this
capacity increase is calculated based on actual vehicle costs
but disguised to be comparable to CDG’s costs. The cost of
increasing the capacity by one vehicle (g) is calculated to
be TRY 1160. The expert opinion of the Chair of Logistics
Association (LODER) in Turkey is used to estimate the
cost of unused capacity for the LSP. It is suggested that in
the long run, this cost would approximate the opportunity
cost of not using the vehicle for transportation. Hence,
unused capacity cost for the LSP (e) is assumed to be the
same as average transportation cost per vehicle c = TRY
1550. We assume that the CDG and the LSP do not behave
opportunistically and they do not exploit information about
the other party. We also assume that the price paid by CDG
to the LSP is externally determined (i.e., it is not optimized
in the model).
The contract between CDG and the LSP was not a
coordinating one; that is, CDG ordered deliveries as
required, and the LSP would temporarily increase its
capacity (outsource deliveries to other available low-cost
logistics service providers) to satisfy CDG’s delivery
requirements if needed. However, this temporary increase
was not preferable by the CDG since it resulted in poor
delivery quality manifesting as late deliveries, or damages
to the products. In fact, as a favorable solution, the LSP’s
permanent capacity increase decision can be affected by
the type of coordinating contract employed by CDG. It is
possible for CDG to use delivery order levels (o), penalty
(p) or reward (r) schemes, or any combinations of these in
the coordinating contract. The results of these different
coordinating contract parameters are compared to the ideal
case, which is full coordination by minimizing the supply
chain cost under central decision maker assumption.
CDG is the party deciding on the coordinating contract
parameters and affecting the LSP’s decision to build extra
capacity. Consequently, the LSP acts upon instructions
(delivery orders) from the CDG. The LSP’s decision to
build extra capacity directly affects CDG’s ability to fulfill
their orders on time, and CDG is confronted with the costs
of not being able to provide the products to the market
when they are demanded. The anticipation function
describes the LSP’s capacity increase decision based on
CDG’s delivery orders and the penalty or reward clause
included in the contract. Table 2 summarizes the parame-
ters used in the contract, all of which are derived from the
CDG’s delivery records, collected from the Manugistics
software used at the time.
Once we validated the model with the problem owner
CDG, we solved it under the seven scenarios as described
in the methodology section so that the CDG could choose
the most appropriate scenario. To evaluate these scenarios,
we calculate an efficiency measure taking into account the
coordination under central decision maker assumption and
the uncoordinated case.
Efficiency of Scenario j = (Performance under Scenario
j—Performance under the uncoordinated case)/(Perfor-
mance under central decision maker assumption—Perfor-
mance under the uncoordinated case) where j [ {1,…,7}.
This calculation results in 100 % efficiency for the case
under central decision maker assumption and 0 % effi-
ciency for the uncoordinated case. The efficiency of
remaining scenarios is in the [0, 100 %] interval.
CDG’s cost, LSP’s profit, and total SC cost are given in
Table 3 together with the respective contract efficiencies.
When there is no coordination between the parties, the
CDG’s cost is TRY 217,498 and the LSP’s profit is TRY
123,039, with the total supply chain cost of TRY 94,459.
The CDG’s cost is lower in any scenario other than S1 (no
coordination). The CDG should prefer coordinating the
chain either using delivery orders (o), penalty (p), reward
(r), or a combination of these rather than leaving the
transaction conditions as it is. On the other hand, LSP’s
profit is the highest with the reward-only contract (S5) and
the lowest in the current situation of no coordination (S1).
Even with the penalty-only contract (S4), LSP does slightly
better (0.05 %) than the no coordination case (S1); hence,
any of the coordinating contracts (S2–S6) would be
preferable. The efficiencies of S4–S6 are the same
(96.1 %) as a consequence of the fact that they coordinate
the members with respect to the optimal capacity increase
that minimizes the expected cost of the centralized the
supply chain.
When the contracts are analyzed in terms of the total
supply chain cost, the supply chain cost decreases by
10 % if it were possible to switch from the uncoordinated
case (S1) to the full coordination under the central deci-
sion maker (S7). The CDG’s partial coordination with
penalty and reward contracts (S4–S6) leads to lower
expected centralized supply chain costs in comparison
with coordination with delivery orders (S2–S3) and a
9.6 % reduction in total supply chain cost compared to
the uncoordinated case (S4-S6 vs S1). It should be noted
that the parameters were disguised to comply with the
CDG’s confidentiality request and considering the real
business environment a small percentage of reduction in
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costs is still desirable to the company because of the scale
of the costs.
The CDG’s delivery orders (o) and LSP’s capacity
increase (i) are given in Fig. 5a, b, respectively; there is no
value for o under S7 since the central decision maker
controlling the two parties would not give delivery orders
from one party to another but arrange the capacity increase
according to the external demand (X).
The capacity increase (i) under the central decision
maker assumption that minimizes the total supply chain
cost is 68 in Fig. 5b. In the uncoordinated case (S1) the
CDG’s delivery order is equal to its delivery demand
(o = X) and is 130 delivery orders per month. The LSP’s
capacity increase corresponding to o ¼ 130 is at its lowest
level (i ¼ 63). When the CDG coordinates with the deliv-
ery orders that achieve the optimum capacity increase for
the supply chain (S2 : o ¼ 135), the LSP responds to this
level of delivery order with a capacity increase of 68. In
other words, CDG should place a delivery order of 135 to
force the LSP to increase capacity as much as is required
under the central decision maker assumption (S7). In S3,
which minimizes the CDG’s cost without enforcing
penalties, the optimum level of delivery orders is 134,
which is responded by the LSP with a capacity increase of
67, lower than the optimal capacity increase under S7. For
S4–S6, which achieve the optimum capacity increase
Table 2 Parameters and
variables of penalty—reward
contract
Symbol Value Definition
u 6275 Unit cost of unmet delivery per vehicle; TRY
d 1745 Unit cost of ordering more deliveries than required; TRY
c 1550 Unit cost of delivery; TRY
e 1550 Unit cost of unused capacity; TRY
n 1160 Unit cost of increasing capacity; TRY
v 130 CDG’s delivery requirement per month; number of vehicles
T 91 LSP’s available capacity per month; number of vehicles
t A random percentage of LSP’s available capacity each month
F(t) Cumulative distribution function of t
f(t) Probability density function of t; f xð Þ ¼ 1
BA for A xB
tl 0.65 Lower limit of percentage of LSP’s capacity t; tl [ [0, 1]
tu 0.75 Upper limit of percentage of LSP’s capacity t; tu [ [0, 1]
o Orders of CDG
x Actual deliveries
X Required deliveries
i Capacity increase of LSP
E(CDGcost) Expected value of CDG’s cost
E(LSPprofit) Expected value of LSP’s profit
E(SCcost) Expected cost of supply chain
p Penalty to be imposed on the LSP
r Reward to be given to the LSP
a b 
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Fig. 5 a Delivery orders (o) and b capacity (i) increase under the scenarios
Logist. Res. (2016) 9:8 Page 9 of 14 8
123
(i ¼ 68) with penalty-only (S4), reward-only (S5) and
penalty and reward (S6) contracts, respectively; the appli-
cable penalty is TRY 500 and the applicable reward is TRY
3426. For example, the CDG should impose a penalty of
TRY 500 on the LSP or offer a reward of TRY 3426 to the
LSP for the delivery order o = 134 in order to have the
LSP increase its capacity by the optimum capacity increase
(i = 68).
In Fig. 6, the CDG’s cost, the LSP’s profit and the cost
of the centralized SC are plotted with respect to the seven
scenarios analyzed for the proposed coordination mecha-
nisms. As was indicated earlier, the lowest cost of SC is
obtained under the central decision maker assumption (S7).
Consequently, the highest cost of SC is observed in the
uncoordinated case (S1). CDG’s coordination with delivery
orders that minimizes CDG’s cost (S3) reduces the cost of
SC by 9.53 % in comparison with the uncoordinated case
(S1). However, the minimum cost of SC without the pen-
alty-only, reward-only and penalty and reward contracts is
when CDG uses the delivery order that achieves the opti-
mum capacity increase for coordination (S2) with a 9.58 %
reduction from the uncoordinated case (S1). Similarly,
penalty and reward tools decrease the supply chain cost by
9.62 % in comparison with the uncoordinated case (S1).
Again in Fig. 6, CDG’s costs are lower in all of the
scenarios S2–S6 than S1. The lowest cost of CDG occurs in
coordination with penalty that achieves the optimum
capacity increase (S4). On the other hand, the LSP’s profit
is higher in all of the scenarios S2–S6. Thus, CDG can
achieve a more efficient supply chain using any of the
suggested coordinating contracts.
Figure 7a presents the change in the profit of LSP with
respect to the capacity increase in the uncoordinated case
(S1). When there is no coordination, CDG opens delivery
orders as many as required (o ¼ 130) and in response, the
LSP’s optimum capacity increase becomes 63 vehicles.
Under the central decision maker assumption (S7), the total
cost of SC is minimized with respect to the capacity
increase decision. Optimum capacity increase is 68 and the
cost of SC is TRY 85,007 (Fig. 7b). When CDG affects the
LSP’s capacity increase decision with its delivery orders,
the optimum delivery order level that minimizes CDG’s
cost is 134 vehicles (Fig. 7c). In that case the cost of SC is
TRY 85,456 and the efficiency of the contract is 95.2 %.
CDG’s delivery orders are analyzed in two perspectives.
The first is the S2: coordinating contract with delivery
order that achieves the optimum capacity increase
(o ¼ 135 for i ¼ 68) and the second is the S3: coordination
with delivery order that minimizes CDG’s cost (o ¼ 133
and i ¼ 67). The level of delivery orders that minimize the
CDG’s cost (S3) improves the cost by 3.42 % in compar-
ison with the uncoordinated case (S1), whereas the level of
delivery orders that provides the optimum capacity
increase for the SC (S2) improves the CDG’s cost by
3.42 % in comparison with S1 and worsens CDG’s cost by
0.16 % in comparison with S3. The LSP’s profit increases
by 1.27 % in S3 (coordination with delivery order that
minimizes CDG’s cost) and 1.58 % in S2 (coordinating
contract with delivery order that achieves the optimum
capacity increase). This level of delivery order (o ¼ 135)
leading to the optimum capacity increase for the cost of SC
decreases the CDG’s cost by 3.26 % and increases the
LSP’s profit by 1.58 %. Consequently, the efficiency of
this coordinating contract (S2) becomes 95.7 %. For the
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coordinating contract with penalty and reward that
achieves the optimum capacity increase (S6), penalty
(p) and reward (r) that would lead the LSP to the optimum
capacity increase decision that minimizes the total SC cost
are analyzed together with the delivery orders (o). This
way, CDG can choose between various penalty and reward
combinations with respect to the delivery orders (Fig. 8).
For example, to have the LSP decide to increase its
capacity by 68 vehicles, CDG should give a delivery order
of 132 vehicles and pose a penalty of TRY 1985 or a
delivery order of 133 vehicles with a penalty of TRY 1116
(see Fig. 8). If the CDG chooses to offer a reward instead
of a penalty, then the level of reward that corresponds to
the capacity increase decision of 68 vehicles with a
delivery order of 132 is TRY 9626. Although this level of
reward increases the CDG’s cost, it leads to a 2.57 % lower
cost (a difference of TRY 5592) than the uncoordinated
case (S1). In the coordinating contract with penalty that
achieves the optimum capacity increase (S4: i ¼ 68) with
o ¼ 134, the LSP’s profit is increased by 0.05 % (a dif-
ference of TRY 64) in comparison with the uncoordinated
case (S1). Therefore, the LSP would be willing to accept
the penalty-only contract if the o ¼ 134, since the profit is
slightly better (not worse off) than the uncoordinated case.
On the other hand, the LSP would be willing to accept the
reward-only coordinating contract with o ¼ 134 since it
leads to an increase in profit by 1.79 % (a difference of
TRY 2201). If the CDG offers a both penalty and reward
coordinating contract, the LSP would still be willing to
accept this type of contract since its profit will be higher (a
difference of TRY 911, 1.79 % higher) than the uncoor-
dinated case (S1), so none of the firms would be worse off
with a penalty and reward contract but indeed both of them
would be better off.
We also conduct a sensitivity analysis on the parameters
of the problem in the current situation (S1) and the penalty
and reward contract (S6) to observe how the critical deci-
sion variables E CDGcostð Þ, E LSPprofit , and E SCcostð Þ
change depending on the associated unit costs. We
decrease and increase one at a time the associated cost of
unmet deliveries (u), the cost of excess deliveries (d), the
cost of delivery (c), the cost of unused capacity for the LSP
(e), and the cost of increasing capacity for the LSP (n) and
show the impact (positive and negative) on CDG’s cost,
LSP’s profit, and the SC cost (Fig. 9).
The results in Fig. 9 suggest that the expected cost of the
CDG is affected the most by the changes in the LSP’s
available capacity (T) followed by the changes in the
delivery cost (c). On the other hand, the LSP’s expected
profit is the most sensitive to the delivery charge (c), fol-
lowed by the cost of increasing capacity (n).We also observe
that the total supply chain cost is most sensitive to the cost of
increasing capacity and the LSP’s available capacity.
To sum up, all coordinating contracts are better (has
lower cost) for CDG than no coordination. When the
parameters of the problem between CDG and the LSP are
analyzed, it is detected that the most critical problem
parameter for CDG is the requirement for timely deliveries,
followed by clauses addressing the cost of not fulfilling the
delivery requests, and delivery costs. On the other hand,
delivery costs and capacity-increasing costs are the most
critical parameters for the LSP. In terms of total supply
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chain cost, the most critical parameters are delivery
requirements, capacity increase cost, and delivery cost.
One would think that the delivery cost should not be
important for the total supply chain cost, since it is the
transaction between the CDG and its LSP. However, it is
critical in terms of total supply chain costs, since it is an
important determinant for the LSP in terms of the level of
extra capacity that it determines to build.
5 Discussion and conclusions
The analysis of the current status between CDG and the
LSP shows that the transportation contracts coordinating
CDG and the LSP could be analyzed as a penalty–reward
contract. Since the CDG incurs transportation costs, its
objective function is the minimization of related costs. On
the other hand, the revenue of the LSP comes from trans-
portation activities; therefore, its objective function is the
maximization of profits. Total supply chain costs are cal-
culated by taking the difference between CDG’s costs and
the LSP’s profits. Five coordinating contracts (S2–S6) are
analyzed, namely coordinating contract with delivery order
(the optimum order quantity for full coordination in the
supply chain: S2 and the optimum order quantity for CDG:
S3), coordinating contract with only a penalty term (S4),
coordinating contract with only a reward term (S5), and
coordinating contract with both penalty and reward terms
(S6). The performance of all scenarios is compared to the
scenario under the central decision maker assumption (S7).
Results indicate that CDG always does better if it uses any
kind of coordinating contract other than the current situa-
tion (S1). However, the LSP’s profit is almost the same
when CDG offers a penalty-only contract (S4). In all other
contracts, the LSP earns a much higher profit. Therefore,
using any of the coordinating contracts is recommended.
This study suggests using a penalty–reward contract to
improve the contracts between a consumer durable goods
company in Turkey and its logistics service provider. It can
solve a limited number of problems such as motivating the
LSP to reserve or install more capacity for the CDG and hence
improving the response rate of the supply chain as well as
increasing service levels. One problem this contract is not able
to address is related to the behavior of LSP’s employees which
was highlighted by the CDG during our analysis of the prob-
lem. In the eyes of the consumer, employees of the LSP are
regarded as the employees of CDG since they are bringing the
goods of the CDG. However, irresponsible and reckless
behavior of LSP employees were observed by the end-con-
sumers as well as the dealers from time to time and these were
raised as complaints in the communication channel of the
CDG.This would be a concern very difficult to be addressed in
the contract. One remedy can be to invite the LSP’s employees
to CDG’s headquarters and explain their role in the supply
chain, CDG’s brand image, and perceptions and expectations
of CDG customers from them. In this research we do not test
different logistics strategies but actually model the manufac-
turer’s anticipative planning to coordinate the supply chain
operations by testing different parameters of penalty–reward
contracts.
Although there are numerous studies on the coordination
of different aspects of the supply chain, studying coordi-
nation separated from other issues may not be helpful in
coordinating the whole supply chain. The research on the
coordination of the supply chain aspects remains in the
early stages. As is also indicated by [2], although the need
for coordination is understood, there is a need for studies
with a holistic view on coordination, incorporating
behavioral aspects as well. Similarly, supply contract
models analyzed in this study coordinate the relationship
between certain parties of the supply chain at a certain
time. However, a holistic model which incorporates all
players of the supply chain will provide more realistic
results. Building such a model and modeling each player of
the chain by using several operational research and deci-
sion models will require enormous effort and comprehen-
sive study where confidentiality of information may
surface as one of the major problems.
The contribution of this study is that it shows the
manufacturer can decide on the contract parameters by
anticipating the reaction of its logistics service provider. It
is proved in this case study that coordination between a
manufacturer and its logistics service provider can be
achieved using contracts and that better levels of objective
functions can be reached mathematically and empirically.
In summary, the proposed methodology and its application
were used to solve a real supply chain contract problem and
to establish an analytical basis for the manufacturer’s
contracts with its logistics service providers. The proposed
framework can be followed to analyze contracts of the
manufacturer with its raw materials or unfinished goods
suppliers. However, some limitations of this approach
should also be recognized. Depending on the parameter
values, market governance could be better than an agree-
ment under a reward-penalty contract. For example, when
both companies are worse off under the penalty–reward
contract, it would be more appropriate to act independently
rather than implementing the contract, which means a
penalty–reward contract may not always be efficient.
Therefore, a sensitivity analysis should be performed on
the parameter values to identify the ranges for which the
companies are better off by using this type of contract.
One of the issues to be addressed in logistics contracts,
which we did not consider in this work, is the transporta-
tion damage. The actions to be taken in the event of
transportation damages, as well as the appropriate
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communication procedures and responsibilities of the
logistics services provider, can be addressed in the contract
as separate clauses, or can be mentioned in the appendix of
the contract as a protocol or a procedure. It is important to
choose a reliable transporter and an appropriate transport
vehicle to minimize transportation damage. For the party
purchasing logistics services, working with an experienced
LSP may be appropriate, since working with a random or
untested LSP may lead to damaged products, delays, low
quality service, and, accordingly, additional costs and the
loss of business. Although profits may not increase as a
result of coordination [28], the costs arising from lack of
coordination may be eliminated.
The use of logistics services continues to increase all
around the world, including Turkey, the subject country of
this study. Current and predicted levels of globalization,
with the attendant dispersion of production and consumption
points all around the world, make it impossible for a firm to
have its own logistics operation, as it is neither sustainable
nor profitable to do so. Nonetheless, although it is almost
obligatory for companies to outsource logistics services,
delivery problems (such as losing track/control of the pro-
duct, late deliveries, transportation damages, not acting as a
part of the focal company in interactions with the consumers,
etc.) force the focal company to be diligent and selective as
to the firm with which it chooses to sign logistics services
contracts, and to spendmore time on contract parameters. As
a response to this, logistics service providers have started to
put more effort into building relationships with their part-
ners, emphasizing service quality and trust [29]. This
transformation and development is not only inevitable, but
also critical for Turkey’s integration with the world.
Commonly used contract parameters in third-party
logistics include service standards, key performance metrics
and timeline requirements [30]. If the members of a supply
chain start a strategic partnership with the objective of
establishing reciprocal trust and a fair relationship depen-
dent on the processes, then they can handle the problems
and their negative consequences in a more efficient way. It
would be helpful in building a long-term, mutually benefi-
cial, and strong relationship to spend sufficient effort on the
clauses in the analysis phase of the contract, defining the
construction of this strategic partnership. In such relation-
ships, the partners will very rarely and most probably
accidentally fail to fulfill their responsibilities and liabilities
or violate contract clauses; nonetheless, protection against
these rare eventualities is preferable.
Moreover, considering the consequences of globaliza-
tion, analyzing contracts for those firms operating in
international markets by taking into account cross-country
differences is another interesting research direction. Here,
in addition to the contract parameters found by mathe-
matical models, corrections for differences in culture and
bureaucracy will be required.
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Table 3 Performance of CDG,
LSP and the supply chain under
scenarios S1–S7
Scenarios o i E(CDGcost) E(LSPprofit) E(SCcost) Efficiency (%)
S1 130 63 217,498 123,039 94,459 0.0
S2 135 68 210,398 124,989 85,409 95.7
S3 134 67 210,055 124,599 85,456 95.2
S4 p = 500 134 68 208,475 123,103 85,372 96.1
S5 r = 3426 134 68 210,611 125,240 85,372 96.1
S6 p = 500; r = 3426 134 68 209,322 123,950 85,372 96.1
S7 – 68 – – 85,007 100
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